Using rich data linking federal cases from arrest through sentencing, we assess the contribution of prosecutors' initial charging decisions to large observed blackwhite disparities in sentence length. Pre-charge characteristics, including arrest offense and criminal history, can explain about 80% of these disparities, but substantial gaps remain across the distribution. On average, blacks receive almost 10% longer sentences than comparable whites arrested for the same crimes. At least half this gap can be explained by initial charging choices, particularly the filing of charges carrying mandatory minimum sentences. Prosecutors are, ceteris paribus, almost twice as likely to file such charges against blacks.
INTRODUCTION
Black male defendants in U.S. criminal cases receive much longer prison sentences than white men do: for instance, in federal courts, the average sentence during 2008 and 2009 was 55 months for whites and 90 months for blacks (U.S. Sentencing Commission 2010). But does this stem from disparities in the criminal justice system (as opposed to differing crime patterns), and if so, at what point in the criminal process do those disparities emerge? This study investigates those questions by constructing a linked multi-agency dataset that follows federal cases from arrest through to sentencing. Detailed charge and arrest data allow analysis of the crucial role of prosecutors' charging decisions, as well as that of underlying offense differences, in producing sentencing disparities. We find substantial black-white gaps in initial charge severity conditional on arrest offense and other observables, including dramatic disparities in the use of "mandatory minimum" charges. These initial charging decisions can explain at least half, and perhaps substantially more, of the black-white sentencing disparities that are not otherwise explained by precharge observables.
Prosecutors are the most powerful decision-makers in American criminal courts. The United States essentially has a system of negotiated justice-in federal courts, guilty plea rates are approximately 97%. Prosecutors enjoy vast discretion to choose initial charges, bargain, and stipulate to the facts on which sentences are based. Yet empirical studies of racial disparities in sentencing overwhelmingly assess judicial decisions in isolation, effectively conditioning on the outcome of this series of prosecutorial choices. This empirical literature tells us little about the underlying disparities in prosecutorial decision-making, especially in initial charging, a decision that sets the starting point for bargaining and usually determines the crime of conviction. This paper accordingly asks:
 Do black defendants face more (or less) severe initial charges than comparable white defendants arrested for the same offenses?
 Do black defendants ultimately face more (or less) severe sentences than comparable white defendants arrested for the same offenses?
 How much of the racial disparity observed in sentences is driven by disparities in initial charges?
Prior empirical research on racial disparities in sentencing has not addressed these questions for at least two reasons. First, the sentencing research has overwhelmingly relied on da-tasets drawn solely from the sentencing stage, which typically do not record arrest and initial charge data. We overcome this obstacle by using linking files provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics to connect data from arresting agencies to case data from prosecutors, the courts, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission; the rich arrest data provide a substantially better proxy for the underlying criminal conduct than those used in existing research. A second challenge impeding research on charging is the lack of readily available scales for measuring the relative severity of charges. Accordingly, we construct several new charge severity measures based on comprehensive legal coding of the statutes and sentencing guidelines governing every federal crime charged in the study period.
We analyze federal cases from the most recent years available, fiscal years 2007 through 2009, involving black and white U.S. citizens arrested for violent, property/fraud, weapons, and public order offenses. While other categories of crimes (most notably drugs) were excluded from the main analysis due to data limitations discussed below, more limited analyses conducted with broader samples suggest fairly similar racial disparity patterns. The sample is limited to males because racial disparity patterns differ by gender, and those affecting black males are of particular policy importance. Black men in the U.S. are incarcerated at a rate over six times that of white men and over ten times that of black women, and men make up over 80% of federal defendants in the sample period. 1 Using both regression methods and a semi-parametric reweighting approach, we find that black defendants face significantly more severe charges than whites even after controlling for criminal behavior (arrest offense, multiple-defendant case structure, and criminal history), observed defendant characteristics (e.g., age, education), defense counsel type, district, county economic characteristics, and crime rates. 2 Unexplained racial disparities exist across the chargeseverity distribution, especially at the high end. The most striking disparities are found in the use of charges that carry non-zero statutory minimum sentences (herein "mandatory minimums").
Ceteris paribus, black men are, on average, nearly twice as likely as white men to face such a charge. The Discussion considers possible explanations for these disparities, including but not limited to statistical and preference-based discrimination.
ties in the initial charging of quite a small fraction of cases appear to be a major driver of otherwise-unexplained sentence disparity in the pool as a whole. Moreover, our estimates are likely underestimates of the role of mandatory minimums because of the use of highly conservative coding assumptions when charge data were ambiguous. Robustness checks using alternate coding choices suggest that had it been possible to identify all of the mandatory minimum charges that were brought, these charges could potentially explained virtually all of the sentencing gap.
These findings suggest that existing empirical scholarship and policy debates on racial disparity in the criminal justice system have overlooked arguably the most important actor: the federal prosecutor. Recently, many policymakers, led by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (2010) , have attributed the apparent growth in the black-white sentencing gap to a recent expansion in judicial discretion: the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in United States v. Booker rendered the previously-mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory. But it may be too hasty to blame judges for post-Booker racial disparities. Booker did not completely free up judges; statutory mandatory minimums are still binding, and there are strong racial disparities in their application by prosecutors. Indeed, we find that a surprisingly large part of the black-white sentencing gap today arises in the very cases where judges have the least sentencing discretionthose in which mandatory minimums tie their hands. 3
I. Prosecutorial Discretion and Disparity
A. Prosecutorial and judicial discretion U.S. federal prosecutors (like state prosecutors) possess enormous discretion, beginning with the initial choice of what, if any, charges to bring. The federal criminal code, which was once fairly narrow, is now quite vast. 4 The definitions of crimes in the code often overlap, which gives prosecutors a wide menu of charging options in a given case, and moreover, prosecutors must subjectively assess the strength of evidence and choose how to characterize ambiguous facts. For instance, if a gun is found in the car that transported a defendant to a burglary, the prosecutor must decide whether to allege that the burglary legally qualified as a "crime of vio-lence" (18 U.S.C § 16), that the gun qualified as a "firearm" and that the defendant "carried" it "during and in relation to" the burglary-all of which are necessary to trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which would run consecutively to the burglary sentence. A lenient prosecutor might choose to "swallow the gun" and just charge burglary.
The existing literature suggests that prosecutors do not simply always seek to maximize a defendant's potential sentence. Prosecutorial discretion is essentially the power to be lenient, and prosecutors might choose to be lenient for a variety of reasons. Incentives shaping prosecutorial choices include pressure to maximize convictions or sentences, career concerns, resource constraints, and the desire to reduce workload and risk by encouraging guilty pleas (for example: Easterbrook (1983) , Glaeser, Kessler & Piehl (2000) , Kessler and Piehl (1998) , Landes (1971) , and Prescott (2006)). In addition, prosecutors may act out of sympathy or a sense of fairness. Schulhofer & Nagel (1997 , p. 1290 reviewed federal prosecutors' case files and found that charges were frequently manipulated to avoid sentencing consequences that were perceived as excessively harsh.
The initial charging stage is particularly critical. At that stage, the prosecutor enjoys essentially unilateral legal decision-making authority, 5 whereas subsequent plea deals must be agreed to by defendants (under counsel's advice). 6 Despite the 97% plea rate, the initial charge is usually the final charge, 7 in part because DOJ policy discourages subsequent "charge bargaining." 8 Instead, plea-bargaining often focuses on sentence recommendations and factual stipulations concerning aggravating and mitigating factors that will influence the sentence (e.g., the defendant's leadership role in a conspiracy, an aggravator, or his "acceptance of responsibility," a mitigator). Initial charge is the starting point for bargaining over all these terms.
Legal scholars, judges, and practitioners broadly agree that these prosecutorial decisions play a dominant role in determining sentences (for example, see Stith 2008; Miller 2004; Johnson & Gilbert 1996) . This was especially true between 1987 and 2005, when the then-mandatory 5 The initial charges are, of course, the first move in a strategic game and are therefore likely to be chosen taking into account expectations of judicial behavior and the defendant's bargaining position. 6 Although felony indictments are issued by grand juries on prosecutorial request, this is a mere formality; prosecutors get the charges they seek in 99.9% of cases (Skolnik 1999). 7 In our sample, overall charge severity was reduced during plea bargaining in 10 to 15% of cases, depending on the severity metric used; in about 85% of cases, the lead charge was identical at the initial and final stages. 8 In 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memo ordering line prosecutors to get special approval for charge reductions (Ashcroft 2003) . The Ashcroft memo also ordered that the initial charge be the "most serious" offense that is "readily provable"-if obeyed, this would essentially eliminate charging discretion. But this part of the policy contains no special supervision requirements, and may be unenforceable in practice (Stith 2008; Miller 2004 Ulmer, Light, & Kramer (2012) , who find smaller disparities).
Black defendants receive statutory "mandatory minimum" sentences more frequently than whites do, suggesting that these charges may be an important mechanism for disparities (Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011); Sentencing Commission (2011(a) ). This raises the crucial question of why blacks more frequently face mandatory minimum sentences: differences in underlying crime patterns, different rates of qualifying for sentencing-stage loopholes, or disparate exercise of prosecutorial charging discretion? Prior studies have not disentangled these explanations; doing so requires charge and arrest data.
Without accounting for possible disparities in the earlier stages of processing, estimates of sentencing-stage disparity are likely to be biased. The pools of white and black defendants 9 Findings of sentencing facts are entered by judges, but judges usually defer to factual stipulations in plea agreements (Johnson & Gilbert 1996; Schulhofer & Nagel 1997) . 10 See 18 U.S.C. 3553. The guideines thus remain a key reference point (Scott (2012) ; see also Bushway, Owens, and Piehl (2012) , who find that state advisory guidelines influence sentences. with a given "presumptive legal sentence" may have different underlying offense characteristics.
Moreover, the negotiating parties and the judge are well aware of the sentencing implications when determining the charges and sentencing facts on which the presumptive sentence is based, and act in anticipation of the sentencing consequences, introducing endogeneity concerns.
The limited existing literature on racial gaps in prosecutorial decision-making conversely does not estimate their sentencing consequences. There are almost no studies of racial disparities in initial charge severity; one exception is Miethe (1987) , who found significant disparities favoring whites in a small sample of Minnesota cases. No existing studies focus on racial disparity in initial charging of mandatory minimums, but research more generally points to the important role of prosecutorial discretion in the application of mandatory minimums. For instance, Bjerk (2005) finds evidence that prosecutors manipulate charges to avoid triggering state three-strikes laws, an extreme form of mandatory minimum. Finally, there are a few studies of disparities in plea-bargaining; these generally find that prosecutors favor white defendants (see Shermer & Johnson (2010) , who review this literature but find no disparity in their own study). The principal sample consists of property and fraud crimes, weapons offenses, regulatory offenses, and violent crimes ( results are robust to the use of the original codes. 15 The arrest offense represents the closest proxy available for the defendant's actual underlying criminal conduct, albeit an imperfect one, as discussed further below. Together with additional police notes (included in the USMS files for a subset of the cases and used in some specifications), the arrest offense also represents a 11 Drug quantity, a critical fact for offense severity, is not reliably recorded in the charging-stage data for this sample. Similarly, the child pornography charge data does not distinguish "receipt" charges from "possession," and the former carries a high mandatory minimum sentence. 12 Ethnicity data available for sentenced defendants indicates that about 16% of sentenced white defendants and 1% of blacks are Hispanic. If non-Hispanic whites experience advantages relative to both blacks and Hispanics (see, e.g., Sentencing Commission 2010), conflating Hispanics with non-Hispanic whites would lead to underestimates of black-white disparities. 13 As discussed below, magistrates and not district courts resolve most misdemeanor cases. We separately assess disparities in rates of district court filing to account for possible selection bias. 14 The results are robust to the loosening the sample restrictions that it was possible to relax. 15 Appendix Tables A2, A4 and A6. strong proxy for the information that is available to the prosecutor at the time of charging. Prosecutors generally receive their initial information about the case from law enforcement. AOUSC records up to five charges at the filing stage and five at the termination stage.
II. Data and Methods

A. Data
However, the AOUSC data do not reliably code the severity of these charges beyond the felonymisdemeanor distinction. 17 Instead, charges are simply recorded as the detailed section of the criminal code a defendant is charged with violating (for example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). That is also true of charging-stage datasets generally, and the legal literature has also not yet developed any readily available scale for measuring charge severity-a problem that has been a significant obstacle to research on charging and plea-bargaining. We therefore develop, calculate, and apply several new severity measures to map the initial charges and their combinations into a defendant's sentencing exposure. These measures are based on detailed legal research into the sentencing law governing every federal crime charged during the study period as well as estimates based on actual sentencing practices in a baseline period. 18 16 The county variables control for possible prosecutorial focus on enforcement in poor or high-crime areas within districts and are rough proxies for the defendant's socioeconomic status. 17 The AOUSC does list a "severity code" that is purportedly based on the statutory maximum, but it is often misleading, as explained further in the Data Appendix. 18 The charge severity measures reflect different proxies for the expected sentence associated with the defendant's combination of charges (without considering other characteristics of the defendant or the case). Sentence length provides a common unit of measure and is how the criminal justice system translates its severity judgments into quantified units (e.g., months of prison).
The first measure-the statutory maximum sentence associated with the set of chargeshas several theoretical advantages. After Booker, the statute provides the only firm legal constraints on sentencing, and the statutory maximum defines the defendant's sentencing exposure.
The statutory maximum associated with the initial charges is thus, effectively, the worst possible outcome potentially faced by the defendant going into plea-bargaining. The statutory maximum also determines Congress's formal labeling of the charge's severity, ranging from a Class A felony to a petty offense. The main weakness of this measure is that statutory ranges are often extremely wide, and the maximum is often a large overestimate of the ultimate sentence.
The second measure is based on the Sentencing Guidelines, which, although no longer mandatory after Booker, still serve as a reference point for judges. The Guidelines provide much finer-tuned offense-severity distinctions than statutes do, but many of these distinctions are based on sentencing-stage fact-finding: subsequent findings of aggravating and mitigating factors that are not elements of the charges themselves but are subsequently found by judges (usually on the basis of negotiated factual stipulations). Because this study focuses on initial charge severity, the Guidelines measure we construct is based only on what the prosecutor charged. We calculate the guideline sentence for each defendant assuming that the statutory elements of all charges are proven, but no additional findings of fact are made at sentencing. The principal drawback of this approach is that it misses most of the variability that the aggravating and mitigating factors are meant to capture, lumping together a wide range of conduct. If anything, this imprecision is likely to add noise and bias disparity estimates downward.
The third measure of charge severity is the average sentence associated with the statutory offense in practice-specifically, the mean for white defendants sentenced in 2005 and 2006, the period immediately before the analysis sample and almost entirely after Booker. The use of cases completed before the study period ensures that the measure is not a product of the decisions it is being used to assess. Only white defendants' sentences were used so as to avoid biasing the relative ranking of sentences by the differential racial composition of offense categories. This measure is mechanical and requires no complex legal coding or assumptions about sentencing facts. The primary drawback is the need for a sufficiently thick sample of cases for each charge to calculate the mean. Charges sentenced fewer than 30 times among whites in the reference period were excluded, which reduced the sample for the mean-sentence analyses by about 24%.
In addition to these continuous measures, a "mandatory minimum" indicator denotes whether any of the initial charges carried a positive statutory minimum sentence. Most criminal statutes set out sentencing ranges that start at zero-that is, there is no minimum. But when a "mandatory minimum" charge is brought, it can powerfully affect the sentence. After Booker, mandatory minimums are the prosecutor's only way to bind the judge to a higher sentence.
The construction of these measures is limited by the precision of the AOUSC's recorded charges, which sometimes encompass multiple sub-provisions with different expected sentences.
The Data Appendix provides details on the methods of resolving ambiguities and on how multiple charges were combined. Summary statistics for all variables described here are provided in Table 1 for the charging-stage and sentencing-stage samples, respectively.
III. Results
A. Disparities in Initial Charging
To assess disparities in whether the defendants charged in district court 19 face charges carrying a statutory "mandatory minimum" penalty, we estimate:
where M is an unobserved latent variable determining whether the prosecutor filed a mandatory minimum charge and i, a, and d index the individual, arrest offense and judicial district, respectively. Prosecutors' offices are organized by district, each headed by a U.S. Attorney. The district fixed effects are included capture any differences in enforcement priorities or norms across districts. X includes age; county per capita income, poverty and unemployment rates and violent crime rates per 1000 population; and whether the case has multiple defendants. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the offense-district level to allow for correlated errors due to crime patterns or enforcement priorities within districts. The results are robust to clustering on offense or district alone.
The absolute gap in mandatory minimum charging rates is large: 18% for blacks versus 8% for whites ( Table 1 ). The disparities are not substantially diminished by controlling for arrest offense and other covariates ( Table 2 , Column 1). The odds ratio ( Table 2 , Column 1) corre- 19 Detailed data on charging are available only for cases included in AOUSC's records--those in which charges were filed in district court before an Article III judge, which are mostly felony charges. In contrast, most misdemeanors are disposed of by magistrates, typically with no prison sentence. Therefore, the analyses presented here are all conditional on prosecutors' initial discretionary decision to file in district court. To account for possible selection bias, we first estimated the probability of that filing. Conditional on the variables observable in the USMS data (arrest offense, district, and age), there are no significant racial disparities in filing (Table A1 ).
sponds to a predicted probability of mandatory minimum charge of over 15% for blacks compared to a white base probability of 8% (the white sample mean). Ceteris paribus, blacks are almost twice as likely to face a mandatory minimum charge. The OLS estimates are quite robust. Each cell in Table 3 represents the black coefficient from a separate regression; the rows correspond to alternate specifications and the columns to the four charging measures. One concern is that the recording of arrest offenses may mask genuine differences in the underlying criminal conduct. In FY2007, the USMS data contain a text field with the officer's written description of the offense (herein "police notes"). These descriptions sometimes include references to secondary criminal activity (the arrest code reflects the primary offense identified by the officer) or to other details that might affect the severity of charges.
Within the FY 2007 cases, the results are robust to the inclusion of indicators for whether the police notes mentioned guns, 20 other weapons, drugs, 21 minor victims, police victims, conspiracy, and racketeering (Table 3 , rows 2a and 2b). 20 Possible unobserved racial differences in prevalence of weapons are a particular concern because weapons often trigger mandatory minimums or other sentence enhancements. But the police notes demonstrate that while weapons are more likely to be cited by the arresting officer when the arrestee is black (guns: 42% versus 24% for whites; other weapons: 7% versus 2%), this difference is already captured by the arrest codes; in our sample, cases in which the police mention weapons are almost always coded accordingly (97% for whites and blacks). 21 Although cases with drug arrest codes are excluded from the sample, drugs can sometimes be present in cases in which the primary offense is something else. The arrest codes do not allow such cases to be excluded, and excluding them on the basis of the eventual charges chosen by prosecutors would introduce sample-selection issues; moreover, exclusion would preclude an accurate account of disparities in gun and violent crime cases, because an important subset of such cases in federal courts have a connection to the drug trade. Under federal law, the most serious offense usually completely determines the sentence (as well as our charge severity coding, as explained in the Data Appendix), so secondary criminal conduct should not be expected to drive the results.
To test this expectation, in addition to the police notes analysis in Table 3 , Cols. 2a-2b, two other robustness checks further illustrated that the reported charging disparities are not the result of racially disparate prevalence of drugs among arrestees for other crimes. First, the results are robust to inclusion of an indicator for whether prosecutor recorded, in the pre-charge investigation file, that drugs were seized in the arrest. Second, the results are also A related concern is that the arrest offense could itself be influenced by pre-arrest prosecutorial involvement in the investigation; this would likely to downward-bias the disparity estimates, because some of prosecutors' preferences are already captured in the offense code. The extent of pre-arrest prosecutorial involvement in federal cases varies widely. Row 3 illustrates that when cases involving the most significant such involvement-those in which the indictment precedes the arrest-are excluded, all charging disparity estimates increase slightly.
Rows 4 through 7 of Table 3 show that the results are similar when the sample is confined to the South (Row 4), and are also robust to the addition of controls for the defendant's education and criminal history, fields available only for cases in the sentencing sample (Row 5a contains estimates from the primary specification for the sub-sample of defendants with education and criminal history recorded, Row 5b adds education, and Row 5c adds criminal history).
Within the subsample for which counsel type is recorded, the results are robust to the addition of an indicator for publicly appointed counsel (compare Table 3 , Row 6a and Row 6b). Together with the county-level covariates, the education and counsel results suggest that racial disparity in charging is not being driven by socioeconomic status. The estimates are also robust to the use of the original ungrouped arrest codes, the exclusion of cases from each of the two largest arresting agencies, the FBI and ATF, 22 the addition of non-citizens to the sample, the addition of controls for Hispanic ethnicity and marital status. 23 The average disparity may mask heterogeneity in the effects of race throughout the distribution of the three continuous charge severity measures. In contrast, the reweighting and decomposition methods developed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996, " DFL") enable the analysis of the full charge severity distribution by reweighting each group to match the endowrobust to the substitution of charging variables that exclude components stemming from drug charges, an approach that means that only the disparity in non-drug charges is measured. 22 We do not use arresting agency fixed effects because they would be highly collinear with the arrest offense; many federal law enforcement agencies target particular types of crime. 23 While our focus is on initial charging, we also evaluated whether charge disparities persisted after plea-bargaining by estimating regressions corresponding to those presented here, except applying our severity measures to the charges of conviction instead (Appendix Table A3 ). The mandatory minimum disparity rates remain almost as large at the conviction stage; disparities in the other severity measures are somewhat reduced, but remain moderately large and significant on all but the guidelines scale. Note that not all of the sentencing effect of the initial charge is necessarily mediated by the final charge of conviction; the initial charge also influences bargaining over all other terms of plea agreements. ments of the other group and calculating the counterfactual distribution. 24 Another advantage of DFL is that it does not require the specification of a parametric model of the relationship between defendant and case characteristics and charging decisions.
To that end, consider each case as a vector made up of a charge severity (c), a vector of defendant and case attributes (z) and the defendant's race (r), with F(c,z,r) representing their joint distribution. One can then consider the counterfactual density f(w; r c =white, r z =black), that is the charge severity distribution one would expect if white defendants had the characteristics observed for blacks but those characteristics still had the same loading factors observed for white defendants. DFL show that:
Where, is a weighting function defined as:
And Pr(black|z) can be estimated by the predicted probabilities from a probit regression of the 
B. Sentence Disparity and its Relationship to Charging
In this Section, we use decomposition methods to estimate sentencing disparities conditional on arrest offense and other pre-charge covariates, representing the aggregate disparity introduced throughout the post-arrest justice process. We then add charging variables to the decompositions to estimate the extent to which these otherwise-unexplained sentencing gaps can be explained by the charging disparities demonstrated above.
Disparities in Whether the Defendant Is Sentenced to Incarceration
Not all defendants receive incarceration sentences. First, some defendants are either not convicted at all or convicted only of a "petty offense." 26 Second, among those convicted of nonpetty offenses, about one-fourth receive non-prison sentences such as probation and/or fines.
Following widespread practice in the sentencing literature (e.g., Ulmer, Light, & Kramer 2011), the choice between prison or non-prison sentences is treated as a binary process that precedes the sentence-length inquiry, rather than including the non-prison sentences in the main analysis as zeros, which would be substantively problematic. 27 Table 4 provides the "black" odds ratios from logistic regressions for these two threshold processes: being convicted of a non-petty offense (Col. 1) and being incarcerated conditional on receiving such a conviction (Col. 2). There are no significant racial differences in the probability of conviction. However, black defendants may be more likely to be sentenced to incarceration. The estimates of racial differences in incarceration are marginally significant (p-value 0.06) and potentially non-trivial in magnitude. 28 If there is racial disparity in incarceration probabilities, it could produce downward-bias in the estimates of disparity in prison sentence length among those incarcerated.
Disparities in Prison Sentence Length
The primary method used to assess the factors contributing to racial disparities in sentence length is Oaxaca decomposition of the black-white gap in the Recentered Influence Functions ("RIF") calculated at the deciles of the sentence distribution Lemieux (2009) and Firpo (2011) ). The RIF approach enables the estimation of the marginal effect of race at selected quantiles of the unconditional distribution. The RIF for each decile of the distribution of log sentence-length (excluding non-incarceration sentences) is defined as:
where Q t is the sample quantile and is the density at that point. In practice, both the sample quantile and the density are estimated separately for black and white defendants using their respective sentencing distributions.
Coefficients estimated in regressions with the RIF of log sentence length as a dependent variable approximate unconditional quantile estimates at the quantile for which the RIF was calculated. 29 This enables us to directly estimate the racial gap at each chosen decile and then apply traditional decomposition methods. To that end, the gap in the RIF at each decile (as well as the gap in the mean) is decomposed using pooled Oaxaca decompositions (Jann 2008) . Unlike the DFL method used for the charging analysis above, the RIF decomposition can jointly numerically quantify the amount of the disparity that could be explained by each of the factors of interest. 30 This is also a vast improvement on traditional quantile regressions, which only produce estimates of the marginal effect of a variable at the qth quantile of the conditional distribution. 31
To that end, for each decile of the distribution of log sentence length we estimate: 29 Following Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux's (2009) terminology, "unconditional quantiles are the quantiles of the marginal distribution of the outcome variable Y, i.e. the distribution obtained by integrating the conditional distribution of Y given X over the distribution of X" (p. 2) 30 Despite the advantages of RIF, it is not appropriate for the earlier charging analysis (for which DFL was used instead) because the distribution of charge severity is characterized by large spikes, which preclude RIF from consistently approximating the unconditional quantile estimates at those points in the distribution. The distribution of actual sentences, in contrast, is quite smooth once non-incarceration sentences (which would otherwise be a large spike at zero) are removed. 31 One cannot use the law of iterated expectations to recover unconditional population quantile estimates from the conditional quantile estimates, a key limitation for both policy analyses and Oaxaca-style decompositions.
where b and w stand for black and white respectively and RIF(S r ) is calculated as described above.
is the vector of coefficients from the pooled OLS regression of the RIF on the ob- The decompositions in panel 5a find large raw racial disparities that are mostly, but not entirely, explained by characteristics fixed prior to charging: the arrest offense, criminal history, age, district, number of defendants, education, and county economic and crime measures ( Figure   2a ). Of these, the largest contributors by far are arrest offense and criminal history. The unexplained racial difference at the mean is roughly 9.6 percentage points, over one-fifth of the total black-white difference in sentences. Thus, even after accounting for observed differences in criminal history and behavior, black defendants are receiving sentences that are nearly 10 percent higher than white defendants. Figure 3a illustrates the total disparity and the "explained" component at each decile; the difference between the bars represents the remaining unexplained racial gaps in sentencing. Significant unexplained differences favoring whites remain in every decile but the first. 33 The unexplained gaps are quite large at the top of the sentencing distribu-32 Appendix Table A1 illustrates the large effect of criminal history at sentencing. In contrast, criminal history plays no legal role at charging, and Table 3 (rows 5a and 5c) showed that its effect on charging disparity estimates was fairly small. 33 It is possible that the lack of disparity at the first decile could be the result could be the result of downward bias due to sample selection on the incarceration margin. While only marginally significant (p-value 0.06), estimates of the probability of being incarcerated (Table 4 ) suggest blacks may be more likely to face incarceration sentences and thus to be in the sample for the RIF analysis. If that is the case, black defendants appearing in the RIF sample may have slightly weaker cases against them, conditional on arrest offense and other covariates, than white defendants do. Sample selection as a result of this disparity is most likely to appear at the bottom of the sentence-length distri-tion. At the 90 th percentile almost half the total observed black-white sentence disparity (20 percentage points) remains unexplained.
The decompositions in panels 5b and 5c evaluate whether these residual disparities-those unexplained by pre-charge factors-can be explained by prosecutors' charging choices, rather than by the post-charge justice process. Panel 5b shows the results of decompositions identical to those in 5a, except that the mandatory minimum charge indicator is added. The total and "explained" gaps at each decile are displayed in Figure 3b . In Panel 5c, both the mandatory minimum indicator and the statutory maximum measure are added; together, these variables reflect the legal constraints on sentencing implied by the initial charge. 34
As Panels 5b and 5c and Figure 3b illustrate, a large part of the disparities that were not already unexplained by pre-charge factors can be explained by prosecutors' charging decisions.
The charging variables are statistically and economically significant explanatory factors at every decile and at the mean. The statutory maximum sentence and the mandatory minimum indicator are capable of explaining about 6.2 percentage points of the black-white gap (which is almost 14% of the overall black-white sentencing disparity) at the mean (Table 5c ). Only about 4.8 percentage points of disparity (11% of the overall disparity) remain unexplained at the mean-half the size of the disparity that had been unexplained before the addition of the charging variables. Both charging measures have significant explanatory power at every decile. In all, after the addition of the charging variables, the unexplained gaps favoring whites are substantially reduced or completely eliminated at all but one decile.
Perhaps most remarkably, the estimates are nearly identical when the mandatory minimum indicator is the only measure of charge severity. 35 All else equal, the decision to initially charge a defendant under a statute carrying a mandatory minimum alone is capable of explaining approximately five to nine percentage points of the black-white sentencing gap at each decile, and nearly seven percentage points at the mean. Although a portion of that effect appears to bution, because the affected cases are likely to be relatively non-serious, with facts placing them near the borderline between incarceration and nonincarceration sentences. 34 Alternative specifications substituted the other continuous measures for the statutory maximum. Substituting the mean sentence measure did not alter the analysis substantially, but the Guidelines measure has less (albeit still significant) capability of explaining sentencing disparities. 35 Both the estimates of the amount explained by the use of mandatory minimums and the persisting unexplained disparity are similar when the other charge-severity measures (the guideline and mean sentence) are used instead of the statutory maximum. The amount of the disparity that can be explained by charge severity is greater with the alternate measures. However, as the unexplained is virtually unchanged, this additional explanatory power trades off with that of other variables already in the decomposition.
trade off with the explanatory value of pre-charging variables already in the decomposition (such as the arrest offense), most of it does not. The addition of the mandatory minimum indicator to the decomposition reduces the average unexplained disparity by half, from 9.6 to 4.8 percentage points (compare table 5a to table 5b) , and leaves the same unexplained disparity as the decomposition that included both charging variables (table 5c ). This suggests that the large disparities documented in the use of mandatory minimum charges exert a particularly powerful influence at the sentencing stage ( Figure 3b ; Table 5b ).
These estimates are very robust to variations in the specification and sample. Table 6 contains alternative RIF decomposition estimates of the amount of racial disparity that can be explained by prosecutors' use of mandatory minimum charges. All use the base specification from Table 5b and accordingly include the mandatory minimum variable but no other charging measures. 36 In all specifications and subsamples, the mandatory minimum indicator is economically and statistically significant at every decile, and generally has a similar pattern of estimates across the deciles. The estimates are robust to excluding prearrest indictment cases (row 2) and
limiting the sample to the South (row 3). One might be concerned that prosecutors treat crimes (particularly those involving guns) more harshly in high crime areas and that blacks may be more likely to live in those areas. However, the estimates are similar when the sample is restricted to high crime counties (row 4). The results are also robust to the addition to the counsel type variable (compare rows 5 and 6), a proxy for poverty, and indeed, having publicly appointed counsel does not explain any of the racial gap in sentencing at any decile within the sub-sample for which counsel type is recorded. As in charging, the results are unchanged by the addition of indicators for police notes mentioning guns, other weapons, drugs, child and police victims, conspiracy and racketeering within the pool for which this field is available (compare rows 7 and 8).
The final 3 rows to The use of the Sentencing Commission's mandatory minimum conviction indicator also allows us to consider whether similar disparity patterns might also be found in drug and child pornography cases-categories excluded from the main sample because the AOUSC charge data were inadequate. At least in drug cases (by far the larger of the two categories), there is reason to believe they might be: drug cases have large racial disparities in sentence outcomes (e.g., Sentencing Commission 2010) and clustering of sentences around common mandatory minimum thresholds (Fischman & Schanzenbach, 2011) . And given the much higher prevalence of mandatory minimums in both drug and child pornography cases, even smaller race gaps in rates of mandatory minimum charging could have a large impact on overall sentencing disparities. 38 We therefore re-estimate the decomposition with the sample expanded to include drug and child pornography cases (row 11). The results in the broader sample are fairly similar to those in the main sample, with the mandatory minimum conviction indicator explaining over 11 percentage points 37 The differences between rows 9 and 10 (Table 6) are particularly large at the upper end of the sentencing distribution. This is likely because certain particularly long mandatory minimums could not be identified based on the ambiguous AOUSC charge data, which for example do not distinguish (within charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1111) between first-degree murder (carrying a mandatory life sentence) and second-degree murder (which has no minimum and a zero-to-life range). Very long mandatory minimums are often only triggered based on special circumstances laid out within statutes, and while we were sometimes able to identify those circumstances based on other charges in the case, often these cases were impossible to identify. 38 In the sample used in Table 6 , Row 11, 58% of whites and 72% of blacks convicted of drug crimes were convicted under statutory provisions that carry mandatory minimum sentences, according to the Sentencing Commission.
of disparity on average-which (although less than the 14 percentage points observed in the narrower sample, row 10) is enough to render the remaining unexplained disparity insignificant.
This estimate is suggestive that disparities in mandatory minimum charging are an important contributor to racial gaps in sentencing in these cases as well. 39 These results are only exploratory, however: the lack of drug quantity information means that in drug cases, the arrest offense is a weaker proxy for the severity of underlying criminal behavior. 40
Like the charging severity results, the sentencing results are also robust to the use of the original arrest, the addition of non-citizens to the sample, the addition of controls for Hispanic ethnicity and marital status, and the exclusion of cases from the FBI and ATF, respectively. 41
Finally, despite allowing for heterogeneity in the relationships between explanatory variables and the racial sentencing disparities across the distribution, the RIF-Oaxaca decomposition still relies on parametric estimates of the relationship between the observed characteristics and sentence length (the initial pooled regression). It is accordingly susceptible to the limitations of traditional Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions, particularly misspecification and functional form assumptions (see Barsky, Bound, Charles and Lupton (2002) for a discussion of these issues and the advantages of reweighting methods). 42 Figure 4 illustrates the robustness of the results to an alternate decomposition method that does not require the assumptions of the RIF/Oaxaca approach. The figure contains the results of a DFL reweighting exercise analogous to the one per- 39 The disparities in the pool that includes drugs are, however, substantially smaller at the high end of the distribution. This is probably because the mandatory minimum variable is only an indicator for whether a conviction offense carries any level of mandatory minimum, an approach that is less effective in capturing variation in a pool in which mandatory minimums are very common and the length of mandatory minimum is an important source of disparity. Even white drug defendants face some mandatory minimum in about 58% of cases in the Row 11 sample, so the mandatory minimum indicator will necessarily not explain much racial disparity in the upper half of the distribution of drug cases (the effects seen at the high end in Row 11 are probably coming from the non-drug part of the pool). When the Row 11 analysis is repeated substituting a three-level categorical variable that differentiates among lengths of mandatory minimum recorded by the Sentencing Commission (three levels are enough to capture the main variation in drug minimums, which are generally zero, five, or ten years), that variable explains about fourteen percentage points of disparity on average, including larger disparities in the upper end of the distribution. These results closely track the patterns in Row 10 for the main sample. In contrast, substituting a categorical mandatory minimum variable for the indicator has little effect on the results for the main sample. 40 However, there is reason to believe that controlling for drug quantity at arrest, if it were possible, might not change the results. The EOUSA investigation file records the type and quantity of drugs seized at arrest; unfortunately, there are serious defects in the quantity field beginning in 2004. But for the most recent three years in which quantity information is available, FY 2001-2003, when drug quantities are converted to their "marijuana equivalents" under sentencing law (a method allowing comparison across drug types), there is no racial disparity in the average amount seized, conditional on arrest offense and other pre-arrest covariates. 41 Appendix Tables A4 and A6 . 42 Given the large overlap in observed characteristics in the black and white samples, Barsky et al's (2002) concerns about bias introduced by extrapolating outside the observed data ranges is of less concern in this setting. However, their larger point about the potential for bias due to misspecification and functional form assumptions remain.
formed in the charging analysis ( Figs. 2a-2c ), but with weights calculated using all of the covariates included in the RIF sentencing decompositions, including the mandatory minimum charging indicator. The reweighting sample includes the non-incarceration sentences, thus also relaxing the sample selection imposed above. 43 The results of the reweighting exercise are consistent with the decompositions, indicating that nearly all of the observed racial disparity in sentences can be explained once the groups are reweighted to account for observed differences in defendant and case characteristics and the use of mandatory minimum charges.
IV. Discussion
Conditional on the arrest offense and other observed variables, black arrestees appear to be charged more harshly by prosecutors, especially with respect to mandatory minimum charges.
Moreover, these charging disparities translate into substantial sentencing disparities. The findings concerning mandatory minimums' sentencing consequences are particularly striking given that such charges are brought in only 13% of cases in this sample (and only 19% even of black defendants' cases). It is notable that disparities within a type of charge that does not apply to most cases could explain such a large fraction of the otherwise-unexplained disparities in the total pool. The interpretation of these results is not entirely straightforward, however-here, we consider some competing explanations.
First, while the arrest offense is the best proxy available in the data for the defendant's actual criminal conduct, it is naturally an imperfect proxy. Between the 430 arrest codes, the multi-defendant case variable, and the written police notes, the information on arrest is fairly rich, and moving from slightly less detailed arrest information (our grouped codes) to a greater level of detail (by adding the police notes indicator variables, and by using the original ungrouped arrest codes) does not reduce disparity estimates. Moreover, the results do not seem to be driven by any particular arresting agency's cases. But there could still be factual differences that are not captured by the arrest codes or by the written description-like prosecutors, officers could choose to describe the same facts in different ways, and if they do so along racial lines, that divergence could bias racial disparity estimates that are conditioned on the arrest data. 44
However, scholarship on law enforcement suggests that the direction of any bias introduced by arrest-stage discretion is likely downward. Studies in numerous contexts have pointed to the possibility of police bias against minority suspects (e.g., Gelman, Kiss, & Fagan (2007)), although there is considerable debate as to whether such gaps are driven by statistical or preference-based discrimination (e.g., Knowles, Persico, & Todd 2001; Antonovics & Knight 2004) .
If federal agents are harsher on black suspects, one would expect them to record, on average, more offenses for blacks relative to their true conduct and to up-code offenses whenever possible. Then, prosecutors' cases against black defendants should, conditional on arrest offense, be weaker and the estimated results may understate the "true" race gaps in charging (or at least are unlikely to overstate them). 45
Another plausible theory is that race is correlated with unobserved characteristics of the defendant (rather than the case) that influence prosecutorial choices. Criminal history is one possibility, but it does not appear to explain much charging disparity. Other candidates include poverty and, relatedly, defense counsel quality. But the inclusion of counsel type and other socioeconomic controls (education, marital status, and county-level measures) do not reduce the racial gaps in charging or sentencing. This is less surprising than it appears, given the high quality of federal public defenders (see Posner & Yoon 2011). 46 While other unobserved differences cannot be ruled out, there remains the plausible possibility that the observed disparities are driven by discrimination, which could be either statistical or preference-based. The mechanism for preference-based discrimination might well be unconscious racial disparities in empathy that drives selective leniency, rather than animus driving selective harshness. (See Fong and Luttmer (2009) for a discussion of race and charitable giving, Linder (1996) for an argument about jurors and racially selective empathy, and Goette, Huffman and Meier (2006) for experimental evidence of own-group bias in third party punishment games.) Statistical discrimination might, for instance, be based on expectations concerning criminal recidivism (see Curry and Klumpp 2009) . Prosecutors might also charge in the shadow of expectations of harsher treatment of blacks by judges or juries (e.g., Easterbrook 2003) . 45 While the conclusions of the policing studies vary, they at least do not generally suggest discrimination favoring blacks. One cannot rule out the possibility that the reverse pattern holds within the sample; federal agents may differ from the state and local police generally studied in the policing literature. But the results at the charging and sentencing stages do not, at least, appear driven by any particular enforcement agencies' patterns. See Appendix Tables A2, A4 and A6 . 46 In contrast, in state courts that have less effective public defender programs, any racial disparities might be expected to be compounded by socioeconomic disparities.
Preference-based and statistical discrimination mechanisms cannot be disentangled using these data. Notably, however, if any form of purposeful race-based discrimination is involved, none of these mechanisms are legally permissible. Otherwise-unconstitutional discrimination cannot be legally defended on the basis of statistical generalizations about group traits, regardless of their empirical support (J .E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) ). In addition, statistically discriminating prosecutors may not have the opportunity to modify charges as they update their beliefs about the individual or case over time, as employers can do in the labor market (Altonji and Pierret 2001) . Criminal cases are often processed quickly, with little chance for personal interaction between prosecutors and defendants, and because DOJ policy discourages charge-bargaining, it may be costly or difficult for prosecutors to change charges even if they do update their beliefs.
CONCLUSION
This study provides robust evidence that black male federal defendants receive longer sentences than whites arrested for the same offenses and with the same prior records. On average black males receive sentences that are approximately 10% longer than comparable white males with those at the top of the sentencing distribution facing even larger disparities. Much of that disparity appears to be driven by decisions at the initial charging stage, especially by prosecutors' filing of "mandatory minimum" charges, which, ceteris paribus, they do twice as often against black defendants. Our estimates of disparities in prosecutorial decisions are likely conservative, because they do not encompass gaps introduced by prearrest prosecutorial involvement in the case, nor do they account for possible disparities in law enforcement.
The importance of mandatory minimums in sentencing disparity is particularly striking given that our sample consists of crime categories in which mandatory minimums are relatively uncommon and our conservative coding decisions almost certainly led us to underestimate their role quite substantially. Estimates using the Sentencing Commission's recording of the presence of a mandatory minimum at conviction suggest that prosecutors' decisions regarding mandatory minimums could even potentially explain all of the otherwise-unexplained racial gaps in sentencing in our sample, at all but the highest deciles. Furthermore, prosecutor' decision-making does not end with the initial charges; they continue to be involved in the plea bargaining and sentencing phases of cases (including negotiating the stipulations that play a key role in sentencing factfinding), and could also play a role in the remaining unexplained disparity that we attribute to post-charging stages of the justice process. For these reasons, our estimates should be viewed as a lower bound on the impact of prosecutorial decision-making on sentencing disparity.
Recent policy and scholarly debates about post-Booker racial disparities have focused heavily on the disparity risks associated with judicial discretion. This study suggests that those concerns may to a substantial extent be misplaced. Although this study does not attempt to isolate the impact of judicial sentencing decisions (which are only one part of the post-charge process), the results suggest that they are probably only a modestly important source of disparity.
Sentence disparities at the mean and at most deciles can be largely explained by three factors: the original arrest offense, the defendant's criminal history, and the prosecutor's initial choice of charges. That leaves less than a 5% mean gap in sentences for the post-charge justice process (including judicial decisions) to explain-perhaps substantially less if our estimates understate the explanatory value of the mandatory minimum, as suggested above. However, there are somewhat larger unexplained gaps at the top of the distribution, so judicial decisions could be producing substantial disparities in the subset of defendants committing the most serious crimes or those with the most extensive criminal history.
But overall, the results suggest that prosecutors' charging decisions are at least as important a source of racial disparity as judicial sentencing decisions are, if not more so. Such prosecutor-driven disparities pose a considerable policy challenge. Substantial prosecutorial discretion is fundamentally ingrained in the U.S. justice system and would be difficult to take away.
Even if doing so were desirable, resources do not permit prosecutors to pursue every possible charge in every case, and prosecutors also must assess the strength of evidence, an inescapably discretionary process. Indeed, the racial disparities found here emerged despite the fact that during the entire sample period official DOJ policy purported essentially to eliminate discretion by requiring prosecutors to charge the most serious provable offense (Ashcroft 2003) .
Still, even if prosecutorial charging discretion is inevitable, sentencing law can help to shape the amount of influence these decisions have over the sentence. Perhaps the strongest potential policy implications suggested by this study concern mandatory minimum sentences.
While racial disparities in the application of mandatory minimums have long been noted, it was previously unclear whether the gap was driven by disparate charging or, instead, by different underlying criminal offense patterns. This study provides evidence that it is not just that sentencing law applies mandatory minimums to crimes disproportionately committed by blacks. Rather, prosecutors appear to be nearly twice as likely to use the laws against black defendants when doing so is a discretionary choice. This suggests that calls by policymakers to respond to post-Booker sentencing disparity by expanding mandatory sentencing rules in an attempt to constrain judicial discretion could be counterproductive. 47 All ranges are up to and including the upper limit, and commence just above the lower limit (except for the first bin of each graph, which starts at 0). For instance, in Fig. 1, an observation Table 5b ] 49 Decomposition in Fig. 3a is based on arrest offense, district, criminal history, education, age, multi-defendant flag, and county poverty, unemployment, income, and crime rate. In Fig. 3b , it also includes the mandatory minimum charge indicator. Columns 1-3 report the odds ratios from logistic regressions for the probability of, respectively, (1) arrestees facing charges in district court, (2) district court defendants being convicted of a non-petty offense; and (3) those convicted of non-petty offenses being sentenced to incarceration. All regressions also contain arrest offense and district fixed effects; the Columns 2-4 regressions also include county poverty rate, unemployment rate, log per capita income, and crime rate. The base category for education is high school dropout. Columns 2 and 3 report the full set of coefficients for the regressions included in Table 4 of the paper. Column 4 provides OLS coefficients for a regression of the log of prison sentence length among defendants sentenced to incarceration. The control variables vary across regressions due to data availability. Omitted controls are not available for cases that are not filed or not sentenced. Standard errors clustered at the offense-district in brackets. * p<0.05, **p<0.01 Table 5b . Unexplained (no charging) Unexplained (with charging)
